

Concept for Unified Action Through Civil-Military Integration



11 May 2009

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE 11 MAY 2009		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Concept for Unified Action Through Civil-Military Integration				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 3300 Russell Road, Quantico, VA, 22134-5000				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 30	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

United States Marine Corps
Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

11 May 09

Foreword

Initially published in 2007, *A Concept for Interagency Campaign Design* filled a vacuum in discussions of civil-military coordination and planning. Resulting from current operations there has been a resurgence of collaboration, discussion, and thinking similar to work done during the Vietnam era. The recently released *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*¹, is a result of this resurgence. The *Concept for Unified Action Through Civil-Military Integration* capitalizes on this work and our past and recent experiences. If today's environment is a forecast of the future, the U.S. is likely to face complex conflicts requiring a high level of integrated coordination. Furthermore, the *Joint Operating Environment*² (JOE) assessment published by Joint Forces Command indicates a future security environment of persistent conflict and global insecurity. What is needed to face this complex future is a comprehensive approach through unified action that makes deliberate partners of all instruments of national power. As highlighted in joint doctrine³, working together with other agencies; governmental, non-governmental and international, in a true multi-agency campaign partnership will be the key to promoting unity of effort. Thus, we acknowledge that the U.S. military may play a supporting role in some complex campaigns and may be best served in support of a civilian lead in such an endeavor. Although the words on the paper of this concept were written by Marines,

¹ U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of State, *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, 13 January 2009.

² U.S. Joint Forces Command, *The Joint Operating Environment*, 2008.

³ Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States*, 2 May 2007, incorporating Change 1, 20 March 2009.

the ideas are the product of ongoing multi-agency cooperative efforts. The purpose of this concept is to increase understanding. The intended audience extends beyond Marines, although it will be successful if it helps Marine planners and commanders in their interactions with contemporaries from other services and agencies. This concept should not only clarify the USMC desire to improve our knowledge and implementation of unified action but also assist in directing Marines where to look for important information. We intend for this concept to inspire a healthy and productive dialogue to highlight the kinds of changes that both the military and our civilian partners can make in order to improve cooperation and teamwork in a complex environment. Commanders and leaders at all levels should study the ideas within this concept in an effort to further the Marine Corps' progress toward greater knowledge of and cooperation in unified action.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'G. J. Flynn', with a stylized, sweeping flourish extending to the right.

G. J. FLYNN
Lieutenant General
U.S. Marine Corps

“The future use of power is likely to be more military operations other than war, requiring more mobile, flexible light forces, working in unison with civilians.”

Gabriel Marcella, *“Understanding the Interagency Process: The Challenge of Adaptation,”* in Gabriel Marcella, ed., *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security* (Strategic Studies Institute: Carlisle, PA, 2008), p. 42.

Purpose

Aimed at increasing interaction between planning partners from all government, non-government, international agencies, and the private sector, this concept is designed to help military planners better understand how they can work together with partners--other government agencies, international organizations and allies--in the design and execution of campaigns.

Background

Now more than ever, complex crises pose problems that defy unilateral military solutions. This “revelation” is not new and does not detract from the central importance of military capability in the accomplishment of national security objectives. The issue is more an acknowledgement of the multi-faceted nature of future conflicts requiring more subtle uses of all elements of national power. The following diagram represents how military leaders and planners need to change their thinking to effectively integrate civilians into the planning process.

UNIFIED ACTION	
What's Old	What's Different
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military Centric • Top Down Networks • Mass/Quantity • Precision Weapons • Combined Arms • Speed and Lethality • Stand-off Warfare • Rigid Adversary • Linear/conventional ops • Nation State 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multi-agency • Fused <u>Bottom Up</u> Intel • Focus/Quality • Persistent & Discriminate • Unified Actions • Agility and Endurance • Personal Contact • Flexible Adversary • Nonlinear/distributed ops • Non-State Actor

The phrase “all elements of national power” is often used; unfortunately, from a United States perspective, the elements beyond the military have not regularly played an integrated role in either the design or execution of U.S. campaigns. This fact stems from many reasons including territorialism, lack of knowledge, lack of personnel and resources and misconceptions of value-added through collaborative efforts between military and non-military stakeholders. For an integrated coordination effort to occur, the guidance for multi-agency alliance must originate from the National Security Council. However, without a comprehensive approach, in which all partners contribute as equals working toward a common purpose, our efforts will likely be ineffective.

The rise in prominence of militant extremism and the rapid spread of information and technology, violence between societies and

cultures is no longer reserved for the traditional combatants. Those who wage violence, including terrorists and more “traditional” insurgents, now hide amongst the people. Marines are being told to “clear, hold and build,” a mission related to the “expanding oil spot” approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) during which the use of force risks the death of innocent non-combatants, the creation of more guerillas, and eroding popular support for the host government and for U.S. presence in the country. In summation, the future challenges are daunting.

Statement of the Problem

Recent years have seen the U.S. become involved in complex, multi-faceted operations around the world. During these contingencies, there has been a steep learning curve as the United States tended to treat post-conflict operations in an overly simplistic and disjointed fashion. The various agencies involved began by operating independently of each other often duplicating or even countering efforts due to lack of coordination and knowledge. In addition, overall effectiveness is impaired by restricted hierarchical lines of communication which limit cross-organizational interaction. Organizational culture (language and doctrinal differences), structure, and fiscal issues have made multi-agency cooperation difficult – as cooperation among competitors often is. As a result, civilian partners have played only a minor role in contingency campaign design and execution.

All too often, military planners begin planning a campaign on their own and develop plans which are overly militaristic. If they involve civilian planners at all, they have done so after the plan has already been developed, resulting in the perception that the importance and relevance of partners’ contributions is negligible. Current operations have resulted nevertheless in successful innovation and adaptation through a process of trial and error. Many initiatives have proven to be fruitful when partners work together. As acknowledged in the new U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, the integration of capabilities in a

number of other U.S. Government (USG) agencies and departments, as well as those of other partner nations, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and the private sector, is required.

There is considerable work to be done in order to develop the relationships and framework that will facilitate execution of campaign plans with the unity of effort required for success.

The Central Idea

When involved in complex crises, campaign planners and the Host Nation (HN) must be integrated in planning and execution at strategic through tactical levels to solve complex operational problems. The HN must have a sense of ownership, involvement and collaboration at every stage of the unified action.

Essential though it is, the military action is secondary to the political one, its primary purpose being to afford the political power enough freedom to work safely with the population.

David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, 1964, p. 89.

Discussion

Military campaign planners have a distinct proclivity to rush to solutions following a cursory analysis of their assigned mission. Unfortunately, though a bias for action is healthy, in this case, moving to pursue solutions without endeavoring honestly to understand the problem and purpose can short circuit the whole process—and have the campaign chasing objectives which, even if achieved, may not lead ultimately to campaign success.

The resources available to commanders are plentiful if one knows where to look for the expertise. In most cases this expertise is resident in the Country Team – a team of experts from the Department of State lead by the Chief of Mission (US Ambassador), the President’s personal representative to the HN. The Country Team will be best resourced and trained to provide the insight required early and often in the campaign. Adding a liaison officer from the Country Team to the military staff may pay enormous dividends. The reciprocal is also true when providing a military liaison to Chief of Mission.

Without some savvy appreciation for the problem, planners tend to deal with symptoms rather than core causes or “drivers” of conflict. Time must be invested in the beginning; working to understand the problem and the purpose of the campaign. Admittedly this understanding is *aspirational*. Campaign planners will never have complete understanding however their level of understanding improves with time and exposure to the environment.

Once the requisite degree of security is established, and as early as possible, command should shift to the Country Team, with the armed forces serving as an integral part of this “enhanced country team.”

The Role of Dialogue

The need for campaign planners to engage in critical discussion, especially when they are formulating the theme of a campaign, may seem self evident. However, in practice, this critical discussion or dialogue is cursory in nature as most teams move rapidly in pursuit of solutions. Grappling with the problem and the basis or reason for the problem (and the rationale behind any proposed solution) may seem more akin to an academic drill. It is not.

Dialogue is vital to collective discovery of the nature of a problem and in any solutions that might arise from an understanding of the

problem. One question will always be: who should be involved in the dialogue? There is no distinct answer and the players involved will change over time as new stakeholders are identified and consulted—even made partners. The value of the giving the Country Team a resonant voice at each decision point along the way, cannot be overstated

Perhaps in an ideal world, understanding would be complete at the outset of a campaign. The reality is that understanding evolves over time. The situation and environment change in relationship to, or as a result of, both action and inaction by the parties involved. A campaign becomes a journey of experimentation and discovery.

The hypothesis is constantly assessed and this assessment takes the form of learning. In this sense, the leader of the campaign learns through his or her operations. Operational learning is an acknowledgement that a campaign's design, architecture, and emphasis will evolve over time—even adapt outright. This process can be expressed as an ongoing *design—learn—redesign* cycle. In many regions, multi-agency partners have been working much longer than the military. We must use their hard-won knowledge in order to avoid relearning things that are common knowledge in another agency's operations.

Some authors have seen the utility of considering the tempo of operations when campaigns are contemplated and executed. Unfortunately, the form of tempo that some have come to associate with military operations is one of speed relative to two or more adversary combatants. However, the form of tempo of most relevance here is one of rhythm—and this rhythm is not limited to hostile wills of combatants, but includes activities within the lines of operation selected. The timeline for such complex operations is a long term endeavor spanning many years in which the key individuals may change many times.

Campaign planners can establish a tempo which has the emphasis shifting in a fashion that always seeks to take advantage of the

situation (normally to exploit success). This calls for adaptation at every level in response to the fruits of operational learning. Rigidity of a plan will likely interfere with the natural development and use of tempo during execution of a campaign. In an ideal sense, planning should facilitate the management of tempo—and this will call for campaign designs that are dynamic.

Key Principles of Civil-Military Integration

1. The design is largely about collective education. It is easy for planners (regardless of what agency they belong to) to become focused on the production of a product. However, much of the benefit from the process is the collective learning that leads to better understanding and allows planners to bring greater harmony to the various activities indicated in the campaign plan. This must be our long term goal – increased familiarity and effectiveness based on repetition, interaction and mutual respect.

2. The comprehensive approach requires a multi-agency partnership. What is the “comprehensive approach?” The answer must begin with an explanation of a “campaign.” A campaign in this sense is a number of activities that are coordinated to realize a singular purpose. It can transcend the various “levels of war.” The comprehensive approach is an acknowledgement that these disparate actions will normally reach far beyond the traditional military responses. Leaders of a campaign should identify key elements and core components that address aspects of a problem as they understand it. An example of this might be the selection of both a security component and an essential services component. The reality is that the military may be very good at a combat or security component, assuming that the campaign has a requirement for elements well beyond this (such as government, economic development, and essential services), there are other agencies with the U.S. government with greater knowledge and experience planning and executing these activities. From a policy standpoint, these other agencies have the “right” kind of monies, training, equipment and organizational structure

for these “other lines.” Therefore, a multi-faceted or comprehensive campaign needs the cooperative efforts of numerous agencies of government to achieve the synergistic effect that will be required in the most challenging of operations. This cooperation should take the form of a partnership for planning and execution—not an essentially military staff with a few token civilian representatives for perfunctory planning. There must be true equality of all members, even though at any given point of the process one member may have the lead - requiring all others to take a supporting role. Territorialism must be avoided at all costs.

3. Considerations regarding non-governmental organizations.

To plan and execute multi-agency campaigns, there should be a broad cross section of represented agencies on the planning team. The next question is to ask who else should be involved in the plan. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other similar entities will often not want to be aligned with the military or Department of State. This may be particularly true of private sector organizations. However, they may have goals that run parallel with the military. They must not be overlooked; they have the resources and experience that may prove invaluable to the operation.

Once you collectively determine your purpose and campaign architecture, you are in a position to converse with NGOs and see if they are heading in the same direction. Quite often, you agree on informal arrangements to work out anticipated problems due to their reluctance to enter into formal agreements. Many of these NGOs must remain neutral—or at least appear that way to maintain dedicated to their core mission. For example, find “neutral ground” for meetings, preserving the NGO’s desire to remain separate, and respect their desire to avoid perceived *collaboration* with the military. In fact, the Department of State may be better suited to coordinate this cooperation altogether. Keep in mind there may be initial difficulties regarding information sharing and the compatibility of different systems used.

As long as the effort is made to facilitate the collaboration, progress will be made.

If your essential services component calls for providing food, water and basic medical supplies/care to the people in a certain province, and some NGOs are already planning to work on that task—see how you can support them (without compromising their neutrality). Efforts to have them sign any document will likely be futile, but the collaboration of effort can still be beneficial to both.

4. Multiple components for a comprehensive campaign. After acknowledging the complexity of the problem, there is a natural tendency to “deconstruct” it. Unfortunately, complex problems do not lend themselves well to being broken down like an engineering problem as so many functions and activities inter-relate in some manner. Most campaigns will have numerous components that are not necessarily “linear” and they must function together as one harmonious whole. The campaign should include collaboration at all levels of the HN government and multi-agency participants – national, regional, state or prefecture, and local, as well as civilian and military.

5. Use all relevant tools of government. Every government agency will not necessarily be represented on a planning staff. The important issue is the mental drill of determining which agencies should be players, knowing how to contact them and making every effort to get them involved as early as possible. There are some agencies that have very little relevance to the situation at hand but may nevertheless want a seat at the table. This may be counterproductive. Clearly, someone needs to make a decision on participants. The time to make this determination is during the discussion of the components (sometimes called lines of operation) that the planners select. The point here is to ask the questions: Who should be here? Who will lead each sub-task in each component? What tools have we neglected that should rightly be a part of this campaign?

In the early stages of campaign design, the process should be particularly inclusive, open to as many agencies as possible, in order to develop situational awareness in a broad base of planners. The priority however must be given to inclusion of the Department of State first and foremost. As the campaign develops, some of the agencies who are not initially actively involved may play a role in a branch element of the plan, and it will help if they are “read in” early so that they are ready to play their part. Campaign design is a participatory process and this will require open sharing of information amongst stakeholders if the subsequent execution is to be focused and effective.

There is a paradox in counterinsurgency theory that says “some of the best weapons do not shoot.” We must resource those “weapons” wherever they are located. We must recognize that they cannot come entirely from the military. People will naturally gravitate to obvious and highly visible options and responses within the context of a campaign. However, in the same way as in counterinsurgency theory, some of the best tools at the disposal of campaign planners are not physical—or even directly observable in their effect. In complex contingencies, which have such an admittedly political aspect, the virtual domain is often the most important one.

Perceptions are often as important as reality—and the perceptions most important are those of the Host Nation’s people. We are usually trying to win the goodwill of the people—their “hearts and minds”—and we accomplish that in this virtual domain of perception management. As always, all efforts must be focused on reinforcing the real or perceived legitimacy and relevance of the Host Nation. “By, with and through” should be the motto for all interaction with the Host Nation. Even very visible military tools may be utilized with a certain political savvy, showing military support of the Host Nation government and security forces.

6. The emphasis will likely shift over time. The military likes to phase operations in a campaign—and then acknowledge that as the

operation “matures,” the operation moves into a different phase. However, our multi-agency partners may not be familiar with the operational progression as such. Furthermore, phases often overlap which will likely require additional coordination to avoid overstepping the boundaries of partners. Different phases call for a shift in emphasis on what is most important; this will often be a point of conjecture. This phenomenon is true regardless of whether or not the campaign is formally phased. This tendency for the environment to mature or evolve over time based on the interaction of the principle players should be an expectation that all planners share. Campaign planners and commanders would do well to try to anticipate and shape this evolution—and maintain the initiative by deliberately shifting the emphasis of their campaign architecture. The reality is that multiple, simultaneous phases occurring in the same time and space demand maximum flexibility.

Often the military commander seeks to show concrete results within a 7-12 month time frame, coincident with a deployment rotation. On the other hand, the non-military partner may set goals and measures of success in a timeframe of years or even decades. This can easily lead to coordination frustrations when establishing campaign goals that are consistent and complementary.

7. Use a multi-agency lexicon. One thing that separates the military from civilian agency planning partners is the lexicon that the military uses. However, the military is not alone in its use of a distinct or unique lexicon. Most agencies have their own language and acronyms. While much of this verbiage is not formalized in the fashion that the military does with doctrine, the language differences among agencies can make real communication difficult.

Once the various agencies of government become more accustomed to working together, a sort of informal doctrine and related lexicon will likely come into existence. In the meantime, the best thing that planners can do is avoid jargon, acronyms, and use “the King’s English.”

8. Success must be reasonably achievable. Campaign planners and commanders often set unrealistic goals for their campaigns. This tendency is reflected in overly detailed plans focused on solving all the Host Nation's problems. The task is made much easier with a clear objective that originates from the Department of State and is in parallel to military objectives. However, all plans must be broad enough to account for the increased flexibility required of any multi-agency collaboration. As all military plans never survive initial contact with the enemy, the same is true with plans in the multi-agency environment.

This would seem to be self evident, but there are many competing demands that planners will face even from the beginning that will often lead the campaign towards a propensity for "over-reaching." Sometimes this inclination comes from a failure to genuinely understand the nature of the problem and to align that with the U.S. national agenda. This is a perfect instance where keeping things simple will be of significant benefit. Candid discussions among concerned stakeholders may help resolve this dilemma. This discussion may take the form of negotiation and likely involve both U.S. agencies and the HN government if one exists. The HN government's limitations will likely be significant but they must be charged with providing whatever they are able.

In general, a few good questions to ask as planning progresses are: 1) What does the HN want? 2) Does the plan align with the campaign's reason for existence—its basic purpose? 3) Is success reasonably achievable given the practical realities of which we are aware?

9. Place emphasis on partnership beyond government agencies. As previously noted, we have to look beyond other government agencies for potential planning "partners". However, one of the entities we often overlook are members of the Host Nation government and even indigenous people who we can involve if we are wise in how we go about tapping into their talents. In a similar manner, campaign planners will need both a reach forward

capability to access information from people “in country” even before the planners deploy. Upon deployment, the campaign planners will need a reach-back capability that is unlike anything recently employed. Expertise must be sought out wherever it exists. That may mean looking to American private industry for knowledge of a topic or area. USAID, which has a long history working with these communities, should be used as a conduit whenever possible.

International agencies will be willing and able to play a more viable role in the process as we are more routinely involved in operations in coalition. Specifically, multi-agency partnerships must not be limited to those with U.S. backgrounds – if an agency is willing and able to contribute, they should be included.

10. The military may play a supporting role. In typical fashion, the U.S. military is accustomed to taking the lead in crisis response, regardless of the nature of the problem. Sometimes this is simply a factor of the military’s ability to deploy a large number of people and equipment on short notice—and sustain them in an austere environment. However, assigning the military to lead the effort is not necessarily the best way to proceed in all cases. Perhaps a civilian led effort will best accomplish national objectives.

Many times there will be different agencies in a lead role, dependent on the phase of the operation. We must be willing to easily transition from supported to supporting and back with seamless transitions. Regardless of who is in charge, when hammering out the campaign architecture, the elements in which the military traditionally takes the lead may be supporting efforts to one or more elements which are more closely aligned with ultimate campaign success.

In order for any agency to operate effectively, there must be a secure environment; which will always be the overarching capability the military provides to the partnership. The development of a stable and functional government that can meet

the needs of the people and ensure a sustainable peace is the ultimate goal regardless of who gets the “glory.”

A Model for Campaign Design

In simplest form, campaign planners want to identify the problem or problems to be solved, establish the campaigns goals and intent for those goals (what we are going to do about the problem and a description of the future we are trying to create), and finally develop response options to realize these goals. This must all be in line with US national policy and be focused on HN legitimacy and eventually – self sufficiency. Planning efforts must support free and critical thinking. The example provided below is simply a model for consideration—and not intended to restrict free thought. It is a demonstration of the chain of reasoning that planners will probably desire to go through in the development of an multi-agency campaign. This will call for critical “outside the box” thinking, minimizing pre-conceived ideas and stereotypes.

A multi-agency campaign design example: (assumes standing/deployable Joint Interagency Task Force)

1. **Initiating directive or guidance.** Campaign planners should receive an initiating directive or some sort of warning order—something that will provide the genesis for planning. Planners need to discuss this and make sure they understand what the campaign (even at the earliest stages of inception) will be expected to accomplish, especially in both military and political terms.
2. **Problem framed following critical discussion.** The campaign planners must work toward understanding the problem in the operational environment. In order to do this, the planners will probably have to bring in outside expertise who can give general and specific information on the country (including culture, government, economics, violent actors, etc.) This will nearly always be State

department representatives such as USAID and the Country Team. Planners need to establish context before they can continue with campaign planning. The problem framing discussion is probably the most important step in design because it provides the critical foundation for understanding. Do not rush this step. The planners need to discuss it thoroughly so that the team can agree on a synthesis of the discussion which is the problem statement.

3. **Collaboration with the Host Nation Government.** In view of the principle of sovereignty, we should ensure all activities that are focused on providing support to the HNG are funneled through it as much as practicable. This will establish a routine collaboration that will facilitate a more rapid transition toward self-sufficiency. More importantly, it will also promote HNG's *legitimacy* by which it is seen as a government that can provide essential services, sufficient resources and security to its people. This will be a critical factor in the successful conclusion of many IA campaigns, to include COIN operations.
4. **Planning assumptions discussed and listed.** Before planners start envisioning solutions in their minds to the problem(s), it is usually helpful to come to a common understanding of what the team cannot know for certain or reasonably find out, but can assume to be true in order to continue with planning. This list should not be extensive. The act of making the list helps planners to focus on the most salient issues to be addressed. As design and planning progress, these assumptions should be reviewed and challenged. In fact, as the hypothesis is actually tested by actions on the ground, planners should return to the assumptions and ensure that these assumptions retain their validity. If they do not, the plan should be modified to best reflect the recent knowledge gain.

5. **Desired vision developed.** Understand why you are there and the purpose of the campaign. Try to envision what the environment looks like when the effort is complete. You may have to decide what “complete” is or what is accepted by all partners as complete. You are seeking some positive result, and that could be a transition to United Nations or even Host Nation control. Therefore your goals must be a common vision, accepted by whoever assumes responsibility after transition. Envisioning the desired future allows planners to do *reverse planning*—which just means they decide what the future should look like and work to get to that future state. Strive to avoid excessive detail; as in combat, the plan will likely not survive “initial contact”.
6. **Goals and objectives established.** Once you know where you are and where you want to go, you can determine a way to get to your destination. Goals and objectives serve that purpose. These could be intermediate milestones to strive for—points at which a transition of emphasis is appropriate. These should be kept fairly general. Planners should expect them to change once execution begins, due to operational learning and an environment that changes with new stimuli. This step is defining the “what” of the campaign design. The leader of the campaign design team, whether that person is an ambassador or a military officer, may want to provide an intent statement that explains how he or she sees this campaign unfolding and lays out the purpose of envisioned activities. As stressed before, this must be a collaborative effort, not a “my way or the highway” directive. The emphasis is on the “why” of actions. Remember that the “why” should always focus on the HN, its people and their security.
7. **Mission statement developed.** It is helpful, especially for people in agencies who will be required to lead various tasks, to have a succinct statement that describes the task

and purpose of the campaign. The statement of mission should address the “who, what, when, where, and why” of the campaign. Before the planning team begins developing a campaign architecture, they will need to determine who the primary stakeholders are (or will be) and consult with them on the emerging campaign design. It is desirable to obtain “buy-in” early so that campaign planning can progress with as few impediments as possible and with the best qualified persons making the key decisions, at the right times.

8. **Campaign design developed.** This step involves determining the aspects or elements of the campaign through the development of an operational framework or planning construct. These planning tools are often administratively referred to as core components that define the concept of multiple and often disparate actions arraigned in a framework unified by purpose. Campaign planners should decide if any of these core components is decisive. That is, they should ask themselves the question, “Is one of these components singularly critical to the ultimate success of the entire campaign?” For instance, providing security for a populace may be an enabling function, but helping to establish a stable and reasonably capable government may be the decisive aspect of the campaign because without success in that line, you may determine that there can be no lasting stability (if that is the purpose). Furthermore, stability is the goal without which no longer-term goals can be reached. The campaign architecture represents the “how” of the design.
9. **Conditions, tasks and initial assessment criteria formulated for each component.** Once you define the aspects of the components, the next step is to set conditions for each element. Simply ask, “What conditions should be present for success?” And this success must be from the point of view of the populace – not the US Government.

Next, select tasks that relate to those conditions. Also, as previously noted, the campaign should place a priority on operational learning and one of the best initial steps for this is to design in assessment criteria that are linked to the conditions. These can be voiced as the answer to a “How will we know when...?” question.

10. **Lead agency selected for each task within the components.** The final step in the development of campaign architecture is to determine among the civil-military team who should take the lead for handling each task for each specific component. For instance, one of the conditions of a component called “Essential Services” might be clean water availability to the residents of a village or province. The task would be to establish a means of generating potable water at the local level. An agency such as USAID might volunteer to lead that effort. The rest of the team will support as required. An example of this prioritization of activity is the use of agricultural teams to facilitate the incorporation of cash crops into the economical structure to replace other less desirable produce. Lines of authority, funding sources and responsibility should be agreed upon at this stage so that everyone has an understanding of what other team members are doing—and any “gaps” can be identified and filled by the supporting partners, including nongovernmental or private volunteer organizations when appropriate. Because situations will be influenced by local security, organizational capability, or host nation preferences, leads for various core components should not be “carved in stone.”

Considerations for Planners

- Do not interpret “interagency” to be agencies of the U.S. government - such a narrow interpretation is insufficient for addressing the multiple challenges that are resident in complex operations.

- Seek the counsel and expertise of civilian partners. The key is effective collaboration between all participants.
- Gaining an understanding of the problem is vital (before campaign architecture is developed).
- The planning group will usually be in a rush to solutions—avoid this natural tendency. Time spent thoroughly deconstructing the problem early can help to alleviate many missteps along the way.
- Make sure appropriate partners have a role in the campaign design, especially if that role will eventually be the lead role.
- Avoid territorialism.
- Avoid organizational lexicon or jargon in discussions.
- Establish personal relationships with counterparts in other organizations.
- The discussion on who has the lead for a task may be interesting as planners may be hesitant to sign their organizations up for a particular role.
- Always keep host country support and actions in mind and realize sometimes the best help you can provide is the least conspicuous variety.

Some Common Mistakes in Campaign Planning⁴

- Assuming a military plan created in a vacuum to be more effective.
- Failing to revisit the planning assumptions and subjecting them to scrutiny.
- Attempting to predict or forecast events too far into the future.
- Attempting to inject too much detail into the planning process—or more detail than warranted.
- Attempting to create a complex plan when a simple one will do.

⁴ See Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 5, *Planning*, 21 July 1997, pp.23-25.

- Attempting to use planning as a scripting process to prescribe U.S. government actions—and even the actions of other players in the environment (who have their own independent wills).
- Attempting to impose rigid planning methods and procedures that conform to military doctrine.
- Not utilizing liaison officers to help build the personal working relationships that are often necessary in collaborative efforts between civil-military partners.


Potential Implications for the Marine Corps

There will be a number of implications for organization, training, leadership and education, personnel and facilities solutions in order to implement this concept.

Force structure solutions must be analyzed such as force modules afloat and ashore. MAGTFs and other units can be restructured to include appropriate staffing levels of personnel knowledgeable and experienced in multi-agency operations. These actions can include creating billets for liaison representatives from appropriate civilian agencies/organizations at MAGTF headquarters. An important consideration for any new structure is that the necessary staff functions are fully integrated at all levels.

For the purposes of this concept, a command-level structure responsible for execution of civil-military operations is proposed and should be assessed. This command organization does not replace the need for integration into planning and staff functions. The following is an example of how this command level organization could be incorporated into a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) level operation. This construct advocates a single MEB-level multi-agency organization that integrates planning and execution of Train and Assist, Liaison and Civil Affairs activities across the MAGTF in time, space and purpose.

A MAGTF Unified Action Group (MUAG) structure might look like:



The Command Group will be commanded by a Colonel (0-6) with a Sergeant Major and 5 administrative staff reporting directly to the MEB commander. The key subordinate organizations will be the Operations Integration Center with 6 officers, 22 enlisted and a civilian operator from the State Department or USAID ensuring appropriate integration of U.S. civilian agencies. A Plans Center will function with 4 officers and 2 enlisted. Plans would be responsible for integrating multi-agency partners into MEB future plans. This proposed structure also includes a Liaison Section consisting of liaison officers from civilian partners to assist in the integration of those plans. The Operations Integration Center will be responsible for integration of all MEB-level multi-agency operations, to include multi-agency coordination, cultural and regional expertise, civil-military liaisons to agencies, and training and assistance. The operations functions would be discharged by a Train Advise and Assist (TAA) Company (HQ 1/2 with 9 teams (1/5 per

team)), Liaison Company (10/30) and a Civil Affairs Detachment (CAD) (11/14/1) all commanded by Lieutenant Colonels. The CAD contains 1 Navy officer qualified in preventive medicine. The TAA Company provides conventional training and advisor support directly to Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF). Additionally TAA Company supports general purpose forces that are partnering with HNSF in order to develop and build partner capacity. The Liaison Company would provide coordination between the MEB and multi-agency partners (e.g., UN, USAID, Non-Governmental Organizations, Provisional Reconstruction Teams, etc.) and other relevant third parties. The CAD will support the MEB in relations with civil authorities and the civilian populace, promoting mission legitimacy, and enhancing military effectiveness.

- Training solutions addressed through the creation of new courses of instruction, and modifications to training and readiness manuals that reinforce the requirement for closer multi-agency collaboration. Experimentation and wargaming should be utilized to the maximum extent possible to include more scenarios that assess integration during operations.
- Leadership and education development solutions implemented, through changes to Marine Corps formal professional military education, by encouraging US civilian agencies to increase attendance of appropriate level civilians at the Marine Corps University.
- Personnel actions will create more appropriate Marine Corps fellowships, liaison officers and exchanges at relevant joint/coalition commands and civilian agencies as required. Precepts should be established so that these important outside assignments for Marines are not detrimental to career advancement.

- Develop, in partnership with the Navy, an interoperable system of forward operating sites, cooperative security locations, and sea base platforms with forward-deployed Marines and partners from government agencies on relevant staffs.

Specific areas for action are:

- There is a need for education of all principal partners.
- All potential planners and leaders need to become accustomed to working together through relevant exercises, exchange billets and fellowships.
- These partnerships require patience from all members as method, language and overall familiarity will be limited in the beginning.
- In some cases, standing Joint Interagency Task Forces will be effective, but each situation will be unique.
- Military education in the decision making process must be modified so that it includes the principles of this concept.

Reading List:

The following are relevant works on the subject for further study:

- i. *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US Department of State, January 2009.
- ii. *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, US Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, December 2008.
- iii. *Commander's Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group*, US Joint Forces Command, 1 March 2007.
- iv. *Counterinsurgency*, December 2006 (FM 3-24, USMC MCWP 3-33.5).

- v. David Galula. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. New York, Washington, and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964.
- vi. *Small Wars Manual, 1940* (USMC FMFRP 12-15).
- vii. Colin Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?*, US Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006.

Summary

Although the U.S. has a long history of involvement in complex contingencies, the record of success is mixed at best. With each new conflict, the U.S. started “from scratch” and invented a new group to work civil-military coordination—instead of building on and refining groups that were already formed. When even limited success was achieved, it came through some sort of comprehensive campaign. History shows that the scale of the operation has no bearing on the issue.

The recent focus on multi-agency collaboration and cooperation will be necessary, given the estimated 21st century Joint Operating Environment. Because U.S. military officers have recently and intensely experienced COIN campaigns, they may be more likely to appreciate the need for combined action by military-civilian collaboration than civilian officials. Regardless, multi-agency design and the “whole of government approach” will be futile without ongoing support from civilian agencies in personnel, resources and training, that will give them sufficient surge capacity when contingencies arise.

Whether the campaign is large or small, the comprehensive campaign that is planned, executed, and coordinated by a multi-agency team is most likely to succeed. Collaboration among the full US government spectrum appears to be of obvious benefit to all involved. The key responsibility of the military commander is to eliminate friction between partners and create a positive

environment in which effective integration can take place at all levels.

The need for collaboration in a complex crisis is well-documented. In such circumstances, unless all agencies involved agree to work toward the same goal all will suffer from inefficiency, creating friction for both U.S. and Host Nation personnel. All formal estimates suggest that the future operating environment will require military planners to incorporate civilians in their planning and execution of complex contingency operations. The purpose of this concept is to help Marines work as effective partners in this kind of multi-agency effort.

Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches -- primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces -- to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention

Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 09, p. 29.

GLOSSARY

Unified Action: The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1-02).

Unity of Effort: Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action (JP 1-02).

Civil-Military Operations: The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces (JP 1-02).

Complex Contingency Operations: Large-scale peace operations (or elements thereof) conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations that involve one or more of the elements of peace operations that include one or more elements of other types of operations such as foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to insurgency, or support to counterinsurgency (JP 1-02).

Provide feedback on this concept to:

Major Geoff H. Baum
Concepts Branch
geoffrey.baum@usmc.mil
703-784-6245

or

Captain H..Parker Consaul
Concepts Branch
harry.consaul@usmc.mil
703-784-3610

DC CD&I
G3/G5 Division
www.mccdc.usmc.mil/